Tuesday, 13 March 2012

Phenomenon: Thing, Act, Fact

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 203):
… the set of things that can take on this rôle in the clause is not only not restricted to any particular semantic or grammatical category, it is actually wider that the set of possible participants in a ‘material’ clause. It may be not only a thing but also an act or a fact.

Phenomenon [Definition]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 203):
… that which is felt, thought, wanted or perceived …

Senser Vs Actor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 203):
In ‘material’ clauses, … the distinction between conscious and non-conscious beings simply plays no part.  The Actor of a ‘material’ clause is thus much less constrained than the Senser of a ‘mental’ clause.

Senser: LOTEs

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 201n):
In languages with case marking, the Senser — or certain types of Senser — may be in the dative case, as in Hindi and Telugu … In some languages, the Senser is realised by a nominal group denoting a certain body part, as in Akan (cf English it breaks my heart, it blows my mind [construed on the material model]).

Senser: Significant Feature

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 201, 202, 203):
In a clause of ‘mental’ process, there is always on participant who is … human–like; the significant feature of the Senser is that of being ‘endowed with consciousness’. Expressed in grammatical terms, the participant that is engaged in the mental process is one that is referred to pronominally as he or she, not as it. … But any entity, animate or not, can be treated as conscious … a human collective … a product of human conscious … a part of a person …

Mental Clauses Of Perception

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 199):
… [the potential to use] a modulation of readinesscan feel

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 199):
… what is construed as the phenomenon being perceived can be a thing … but it can also be an act

Mental Clauses Of Cognition

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 199):
They are able to set up another clause or set of clauses as the content of thinking — as the ideas created by cognition.

Mental Clauses Of Emotion: Gradability

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 198):
The verbs serving as Process are gradable; they form points on a scale … expressing degrees … This property of lexical and grammatical gradability is typical of ‘mental’ clauses construing emotions.

Mental Clause Subtypes: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 210):
Like all other experiential systems, the system of type of sensing construes experience as indeterminate: the four different types of sensing shade into one another. For example, perception shades into cognition, with I see coming to mean not only ‘I perceive visually’ but also ‘I understand’. And cognition shades into perception with clauses where remember serves as the Process; unlike ‘cognitive’ clauses in general such clauses can be construed with a macrophenomenal Phenomenon

Mental Clause Subtypes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 208):
Within the general class of ‘mental’ clauses, there are four different subtypes of sensing: ‘perceptive’, ‘cognitive’, ‘desiderative’ and ‘emotive’. These are treated by the grammar as distinct types. They differ with respect to phenomenality, directionality, gradability, potentiality and ability to serve as metaphors of modality