Wednesday, 21 March 2018

Relational Clauses: Instantiation And Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 263):
In her account of ‘relational’ clauses, Davidse (1992, 1996) adopts a semiotic approach, interpreting class–membership by reference to the semiotic relation of instantiation and identity by reference to the semiotic relation of realisation.

Tuesday, 20 March 2018

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Relational Clauses & Nominal Groups

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262n):
There is, however, a deeper sense in which ‘relational’ clauses are ‘nominal’: they construe the same range of relations as those of modification within the nominal group:
the house was old : the old house ::
the house was in Wessex : the house in Wessex ::
the house was Thomas’s : Thomas’s house.

Monday, 19 March 2018

Relational Clauses: No Structurally Present Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262n):
Such clauses have often been called ‘nominal clauses’, in contrast to ‘verbal clauses’, where there is a Process present in the structure of the clause. But this reflects only the view ‘from below’ and hides the fact that in languages such as Arabic ‘relational’ clauses that are marked for aspect and/or polarity typically have a structurally present Process.

Sunday, 18 March 2018

Relational Clauses: Class–Membership And Identity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262):
The configuration of Process + ‘Be-er1’ + ‘Be-er2’ opens up the potential for construing the abstract relationships of class–membership and identity in all domains of experience. Class–membership is construed by attributive clauses and identity by identifying ones. These two ‘relational’ clause types cut across the inner and outer experience of ‘mental’ and ‘material’ clauses

Saturday, 17 March 2018

Relational Clauses Vs Material & Mental Clauses: Verb Salience

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262):
Verbs in general in ‘relational’ clauses are typically non-salient, whereas verbs in ‘material’ and ‘mental’ clauses are salient at the accented syllable …

Friday, 16 March 2018

Relational Clauses: Prototypical Configuration

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262):
This tells us something significant about a prototypical configuration of ‘being’: the experiential ‘weight’ is construed in the two participants, and the process is merely a highly generalised link between these two participants … Thus the verbs that occur most frequently as the Process of a ‘relational’ clause are be and have; and they are typically both unaccented and phonologically reduced … This weak phonological presence of the Process represents iconically its highly generalised grammatical nature. The limiting case of weak presence is absence; and the Process is in fact structurally absent in certain ‘non-finite’ ‘relational’ clauses in English … and in many languages there is no structurally present Process in the ‘unmarked’ type of ‘relational’ clause … Here the ‘relational’ clause is simply a configuration of ‘Be-er1’ + ‘Be-er2’.

Thursday, 15 March 2018

Relational Clauses Vs Material & Mental Clauses: Inherent Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261-2):
In ‘relational’ clauses, there are two parts to the ‘being’: something is said to ‘be’ something else. In other words, a relationship of being is set up between two separate entities. This means that in a ‘relational’ clause in English, there are always two inherent participants – two ‘be-ers’. In contrast, the general classes of ‘material’ and ‘mental’ clauses have only one inherent participant (the Actor and the Senser, respectively).  Thus, while we can have a ‘material’ clause with one participant such as she was walking or she was walking into the room, we cannot have a ‘relational’ clause such as she was, with only one participant; we have to have two: she was in the room. Similarly, a ‘mental’ clause with one participant such as she rejoiced is possible; but the nearest ‘relational’ equivalent must have two participants – she was happy, not she was.

Blogger Comment:

Note that attributive clauses with qualitative Processes, such as this stinks, manifest only one participant, unless the Attribute is interpreted as conflated with the Process; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271).

Wednesday, 14 March 2018

Relational Clauses Vs Mental Clauses: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261):
With a ‘mental’ clause, the phenomenon of consciousness can be construed as an idea brought into existence through the process of consciousness and represented grammatically as a separate clause … but this is not possible with ‘relational’ clauses.

Tuesday, 13 March 2018

Relational & Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses: Acts & Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261):
In being able to be construed not only with things as participants, but also with acts and facts, ‘relational’ clauses clearly differ from ‘material’ ones; but they resemble ‘mental’ ones in this respect.  However, in a relational clause, these things, acts and facts are not construed as a phenomenon of consciousness; rather, they are construed as one element in a relationship of being. Thus while a thing, act or fact construed as a Phenomenon in a ‘mental’ clause is configured with a Senser, in a ‘relational’ clause, a thing, act or fact construed as a participant is configured with another relational participant that has to come from the same domain of being [material vs semiotic].

Monday, 12 March 2018

Relational Clauses Vs Mental Clauses: Participanthood

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261):
… while one participant in a ‘mental’ clause, the Senser, is always endowed with consciousness, this is not the case with ‘relational’ clauses.  If anything, the participants in ‘relational’ clauses are more like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause – not only things, but also acts and facts can be construed as participants in a ‘relational’ clause.

Sunday, 11 March 2018

Relational Processes: Un/Marked Present Tense

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 260):
In the nature of the unfolding of the process, ‘relational’ clauses thus pattern like ‘mental’ ones rather than like ‘material’ ones; and this is reflected in the unmarked present tense. … The present in present is in fact highly marked and is largely restricted to ‘relational’ clauses of behavioural propensity.

Saturday, 10 March 2018

Relational [Static] Vs Material [Dynamic] Construals By Expansion Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 260):
Thus, static location in space [enhancement] is construed relationallyshe’s in the dining room, but dynamic motion through space is construed materiallyshe’s walking into the dining room. Similarly, static possession [extension] is construed relationallyshe has a mahogany dining table, but dynamic transfer of possession is construed materiallyshe’s getting a mahogany dining table; she’s being given a mahogany dining table; and static quality [elaboration] is construed relationallythe bottle’s empty, but dynamic change in quality is construed materiallythe bottle’s emptying; she’s emptying the bottle.

Friday, 9 March 2018

Relational Clauses: Nature Of Unfolding

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 260):
Unlike ‘material’ clauses, but like ‘mental’ ones, ‘relational’ clauses prototypically construe change as unfolding ‘inertly’, without any input of energy — typically as a uniform flow without distinct phases of unfolding (unlike the contrast in material processes between the initial phase and the final phase of the unfolding of a process, the outcome).

Thursday, 8 March 2018

Relational Clauses: Viewed From Above

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 259):
As we have seen, ‘material’ clauses are concerned with our experience of the material world and ‘mental’ clauses are concerned with our experience of the world of our own consciousness. Both this outer experience and this inner experience may be construed by ‘relational’ clauses; but they model this experience as ‘being’ rather than ‘doing’ or ‘sensing’.

Wednesday, 7 March 2018

Looking 'From Below' & 'From Around' [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 259):
Looking … ‘from below’ (how are they realised?) and ‘from around’ (what other systemic variants are possible?) …

Tuesday, 6 March 2018

Relational Clauses: Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 259):
‘Relational’ clauses serve to characterise and identify.

Monday, 5 March 2018

The Transitivity Environments Of 'Remind'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 257n):
As is often the case of with verbs, remind has different senses corresponding to uses in different transitivity environments.
(i) In a ‘mental’ clause, remind may have different senses.
(1) Remind may serve as a causative equivalent of remember, ‘cause somebody to remember’ with the causer in the role of Inducer (if the clause is ‘phenomenal’, the Phenomenon represented on the model of a circumstance of Matter (e.g. [Inducer:] This reminds [Senser:] me [Phenomenon:] of an interesting encounter I had a few years ago with the late Col M.S. Rao, the celebrated physician.) and if the clause is ‘hyperphenomenal’ with a project ‘idea’ clause, remind is configured with only Inducer + Senser (e.g. [Inducer:] The church clock striking the hour reminds [Senser:] me that I must hurry if this is to be ready on time for the printer.). 
(2) Alternatively, remind may have the sense of ‘cause somebody to see a relationship of similarity’ (e.g. They [‘the children’] reminded old Amai of a flock of bright birds gathering together to peck corn.).
(ii) In a ‘verbal’ clause, remind has the sense of ‘tell somebody something so that s/he will remember it’, the ‘verbal’ clause projects a report or quote (e.g. ‘Don’t forget, there was the hope it would pass for a natural death’, Pauling reminded him.). 
(iii) In a hypotactic verbal group complex, remind serves as a causative variant of remember (e.g. Mary reminded John to do it).

Sunday, 4 March 2018

Mental Clause Subtypes: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 257):
Like all other experiential systems, the system of type of sensing construes experience as indeterminate: the four different types of sensing shade into one another. For example, perception shades into cognition, with I see coming to mean not only ‘I perceive visually’ but also ‘I understand’. And cognition shades into perception with clauses where remember serves as the Process; unlike ‘cognitive’ clauses in general such clauses can be construed with a macrophenomenal Phenomenon

Saturday, 3 March 2018

Mental Clause Subtypes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 256):
Within the general class of ‘mental’ clauses, there are four different subtypes of sensing: ‘perceptive’, ‘cognitive’, ‘desiderative’ and ‘emotive’. These are treated by the grammar as distinct types. They differ with respect to phenomenality, directionality, gradability, potentiality and ability to serve as metaphors of modality

Friday, 2 March 2018

Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses [Diagnostic: Probe & Substitute]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 255):
Mental clauses also differ from material ones with respect to the use of do as a substitute verb. … Mental processes … are not kinds of doing, and cannot be probed or substituted by do.

Thursday, 1 March 2018

Mental Process: Present In Present Tense (Marked)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 255):
The present in present with a mental process is a rather highly conditioned kind of inceptive aspect, as in I feel I’m knowing the city for the first time (‘I’m getting to know’);

Wednesday, 28 February 2018

Material Process: Simple Present Tense (Marked)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254-5, 255n):
The simple present with a material process is general or habitual – that is, the occurrence of the process is construed as generalised or as habitual, e.g. they build a house for every employee. … 
In addition, there is a registerially restricted use of the simple present tense. In commentary accompanying demonstrations and the like, the simple present is used.

Tuesday, 27 February 2018

'Marked' Option [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254):
… this means that it is less frequent and that it carries a special interpretation.

Monday, 26 February 2018

Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses [Diagnostic: Tense]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254):
‘Material’ and ‘mental’ processes also differ with respect to the way that they unfold in time and this is reflected in the grammatical system of TENSE. … In a ‘mental’ clause, the unmarked present tense is the simple present … But in a ‘material’ clause the unmarked present tense is the present in present

Sunday, 25 February 2018

Idea Clauses Vs Fact Clauses [Diagnostic For Clause Constituents]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254):
Thus while ‘fact’ clauses serve as the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause and can therefore be made Subject and be theme–predicated, ‘idea’ clauses are not part of the ‘mental’ clause but are rather combined with the ‘mental’ clause in a clause nexus of projection.

Saturday, 24 February 2018

Projecting Representations Of The Content Of Consciousness: Ideas

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253, 254):
But there is one further option open to such clauses – an option that sets them apart not only from ‘material’ clauses but also from ‘relational’ ones. This option is the ability to set up another clause ‘outside’ the ‘mental’ clause as the representation of the ‘content’ of consciousness. … Here the ‘mental’ clause projects another clause (or combination of clauses) as a representation of the content of thinking, believing, presuming and so on; the projected clause is called an idea clause.

Friday, 23 February 2018

Facts & Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253):
Given the semiotic nature of facts, it stands to reason that they cannot serve as participants in ‘material’ clauses. When they do occur in what might appear to be a ‘material’ clauses, these clauses are abstract; and they have to be interpreted either mentally or relationally

Thursday, 22 February 2018

Facts: Status Signals

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253):
The status of the ‘fact’ clause is often signalled by the noun fact itself … or by another ‘fact’ noun such as notion, idea, possibility.

Wednesday, 21 February 2018

Metaphenomenon: Environment

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253):
The most common environment for a metaphenomenal Phenomenon is that of a clause of emotion where the Phenomenon is construed as impinging on the Senser’s consciousness.

Tuesday, 20 February 2018

Facts vs Acts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252-3, 253n):
A fact is on a higher level of abstraction than an ordinary thing or an act. Ordinary things and acts are both material phenomena; they can be seen, heard and perceived in other ways. Thus while an act is more complex than an ordinary thing, it still exists in the same material realm. In contrast, a fact is not a material phenomenon but rather a semiotic one: it is a proposition (or sometimes a proposal) construed as existing in its own right in the semiotic realm, without being brought into existence by somebody saying it
We could say that a fact is an act that has been propositionalised — that has been given existence as a semiotic phenomenon.

Monday, 19 February 2018

Metaphenomenal Mental Clauses: Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252):
In a ‘metaphenomenal mental’ clause, the Phenomenon is realised by a (typically finite) clause denoting a fact.